Do elections motivate incumbent politicians to serve their voters? In this paper we use millions of service requests placed by residents in U.S. cities to measure constituency responsiveness. We then test whether an unusual policy change in New York City, which enabled city councilors to run for three rather than two terms in oce, improved constituency responsiveness in previously term-limited councilors' districts. Using dierence-in-dierences, we nd robust evidence for this. Taking advantage of dierential timing of local election races in New York City and San Francisco, we also nd late-term improvements to responsiveness in districts represented by reelection seeking incumbents. Elections improve municipal services, but also create cycles in constituency responsiveness. ese ndings have implications for theories of representative democracy. A prominent conception of representative democracy, dating back to at least James Madison, holds that periodic voting promotes political accountability (Madison [] ). is "electoral connection" (Mayhew ) encourages representatives to serve their constituents for fear of being ousted on election day. Prior empirical research on whether such a connection exists falls into two categories. First, do representatives shirk in their nal term in oce (when the electoral connection is absent)? Second, do representatives shirk when elections are distant in time (when the electoral connection is weakened)?
A prominent conception of representative democracy, dating back to at least James Madison, holds that periodic voting promotes political accountability (Madison [] ) . is "electoral connection" (Mayhew ) encourages representatives to serve their constituents for fear of being ousted on election day. Prior empirical research on whether such a connection exists falls into two categories. First, do representatives shirk in their nal term in oce (when the electoral connection is absent)? Second, do representatives shirk when elections are distant in time (when the electoral connection is weakened)?
In this paper, we shine new light on these questions using a new measure of constituency services as well as a new quasi-experimental research design. Addressing constituency requests is a central activity for most elected ocials (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina ; Fiorina , ch. ; King ; Mayhew ) . Yet, relatively few studies assess whether electoral incentives improve constituency responsiveness -or, conversely, whether a weaker electoral connection causes politicians to shirk on this activity. We therefore collect data on more than million service requests placed by residents in New York City (NYC) and San Francisco (SF).
We then link these data with the election districts of local city councilors to study how response times to service requests are shaped by councilors' electoral incentives.
To do this, we rst take advantage of an unusual policy change in NYC, where city councilors voted in to extend their own term limits from two to three terms. is policy change allows us to implement a dierence-in-dierences strategy, comparing changes to response times in districts with newly eligible councilors to changes in districts represented by rst-term councilors, who were always eligible for reelection.
is strategy eliminates many confounders that could bias the relationship between electoral incentives and incumbent eort, such as cross-sectional quality dierences between politicians (due to skill or experience) and time shocks that aect responsiveness among all representatives. e results from this analysis indicate that elections substantially improve constituency responsiveness.
To further assess the importance of elections, and to extend our analysis beyond NYC, we also analyze whether incumbents are less responsive earlier in their terms, when voters direct less attention to politics For example, Mayhew (, ) observes, "For the average congressman the staple way [to claim credit] is to trac in what may be called 'particularized benets, ' [the bulk of which] come under the heading of 'casework' -the thousands of favors congressional oces perform for supplicants in ways that normally do not require legislative action. Each oce has skilled professionals who can play the bureaucracy like an organ -pushing the right pedals to produce the desired eects. "
In Table A ., we summarize the empirical literature on last-term shirking in the United States. Of the empirical papers we surveyed, only two analyzed a measure of constituency services, and in both cases this measure was self-reported by state legislators (Carey, Niemi and Powell ; Carey et al. ) . (Lenz and Healy ; Huber, Hill and Lenz ) . Term limits and staggered elections mean that incumbents within the same city run for reelection at dierent times. us, we compare changes to responsiveness among reelection-seeking incumbents to changes among incumbents who either have a reelection bid at a later time or are ineligible to seek reelection. We nd that, while constituency responsiveness improves in all districts as elections approach, it improves much more rapidly in districts represented by reelection-seeking incumbents.
e ip side of this nding, of course, is that incumbents exert relatively less eort earlier in their terms.
In addition to providing placebo tests to shore up the validity of our research design, we address two alternative interpretations of these results. First, we show that the results do not reect eort reallocation from or to legislative activity (e.g., introducing or sponsoring ordinances or resolutions). We nd that incumbents' eorts on legislation remained constant even as they were becoming more responsive to demands for constituency services. Second, we do not nd that constituents submitted more (or fewer) requests in districts where councilors became eligible for a third term. Our results are driven by the supply of constituency service, not changes in demand for councilors' time.
Our ndings support the conception of representative democracy articulated by Madison. ey also bolster prominent political economy models on elections (Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose ; Besley ; Cummins ; Figlio ; Rothenberg and Sanders ; Snyder and Ting ). Our results indicate that, in the context of two major U.S. cities, these models are correct in predicting both that elections discipline politicians and that they create cycles in incumbent responsiveness.
Elections and Shirking: eoretical and Empirical Background
A large literature in political science shows how the electoral connection -which normally forces politicians to exert costly eorts on behalf of constituents -can be severed or attenuated. First, incumbents entering their last terms in oce no longer need to worry about voters punishing them at the polls for their (in)actions Franzese (, ) reviews the literature on electoral cycles and concludes, "On balance, then, the empirical literature uncovers some possible, but inconsistent and weak, evidence for electoral cycles in macroeconomic outcomes, with evidence for cycles in real variables generally weakest (but not wholly absent To clarify these ideas, consider a simple maximization problem in which incumbents choose how much eort e t 2 [0, e] to exert at a cost c in each of T periods (e.g., months) in their term. If eligible, eort increases their probability of reelection, represented by the function (·). max e 1 ,...,e T ( T X t=1 1(Eligible) (e t , t) ce t ) () Incumbents maximize their payo by selecting the eort level that equalizes the marginal benet and cost of eort in each period (i.e., e ⇤ t = arg{1(Eligible) e (e, t) = c}). While ineligible incumbents would never want to exert themselves, incumbents seeking reelection make some eort in every period, as the returns to doing so are always positive, even if sometimes minuscule. us, term limits reduce incumbent eort -the rst prediction we test in this paper. Now suppose that the returns to eort increase as the next election approaches. Past research has oered two reasons for this. First, if voters suer from recency bias (e.g., Lenz and Healy ; Huber, Hill and Lenz ), incumbents concentrate eorts just before their reelection contests -the period that weighs most heavily on voters' minds when they cast their votes (Nordhaus ; Shepsle et al. ; Tue ) .
Second, even if voting is prospective rather than retrospective, reelection-seeking incumbents may ramp up their eorts as elections approach to signal their superior competence (Rogo ) . ese two strands of the literature both imply that the optimal level of eort for eligible incumbents increases as elections approach
In addition to term limits and electoral proximity, simply having elections at all is frequently used to measure the impact of electoral incentives. In particular, past research has studied the impact of elections versus appointments, nding that elected representatives are more responsive (Grossman et al. ) and serve a broader set of constituents (Sances ) than appointed leaders.
e (e, t) > 0 for every t 2 {1, . . . , T } For a review of models making this and related claims, see Dewan and Shepsle (). Mathematically, (e, t) is a continuous function with increasing dierences. See Besley () and Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts () for other signaling models in this tradition.
(i.e., e ⇤ t > e ⇤ t for any t > t). us, eligible incumbents should increase their eort levels over the course of their terms (while eort among ineligible incumbents should remain constant).
Empirical Challenges
Despite the clarity of these two predictions, one can nd empirical studies that claim to support and refute both of them. Table A . provides evidence for this. is table summarizes studies of last-term shirking in the United States. Of these studies, half nd evidence of shirking while the other half nd no or inconclusive evidence. Table A . highlights three ways in which empirical studies can be extended to potentially resolve or clarify these mixed results. First, past research has focused on "ideological shirking, " analyzing politicians' voting records and policy outcomes while in oce. Constituency services -one of the most common activities in the daily lives of representatives (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina ; Fiorina , ch. ; Mayhew ) -have received less attention. Our review revealed two studies of this activity (Carey, Niemi and Powell ; Carey et al. ) , both of which use measures of constituency services that were self-reported by state legislators.
Second, most studies of shirking focus on only one incumbent activity. Doing so makes it dicult to distinguish between two dierent outcomes: a shirking incumbent and an incumbent who is reallocating eort across activities. For example, if a last-term incumbent decides to devote ten fewer hours per week to legislation but allocates twenty additional hours per week to casework, a study focusing on legislation may wrongly conclude that the incumbent shirked in her last term. To reduce the possibility that such reallocation could be driving our results, this paper analyzes legislative activity in addition to constituency services. We acknowledge that these activities do not capture all ways in which representatives serve constituents; as Lott (, ) points out, there are "as many [potential measures of eort] as there are outputs that a politician is aligns with a large literature on electoral cycles in incumbents' behavior (Schumpeter ; Nordhaus ; Tue ; Rogo ; Schultz ; Franzese ; Canes-Wrone and Park ).
Franzese () and Canes-Wrone and Park () review empirical results in the literature on electoral cycles in incumbent eort and reach the same conclusion.
Studies of ideological shirking can in turn be divided into three categories, analyzing whether last-term incumbents () vote dierently than they have previously (e.g., Lott ; Lott and Bronars ; Snyder and Ting ), () vote in opposition to their constituents' preferences (e.g., Besley ; Wright ; Tien ), or () favor a dierent set of scal policies (e.g., Erler ; Keele, Malhotra and McCubbins ).
produces. " We present the analysis of legislative action as a suggestive test of (no) reallocation across two important duties.
ird, some research on shirking has relied on cross-sectional comparisons of legislators that are or are not in their last terms in oce. Omitted variables that are dicult to measure, such as motivation or quality, may threaten causal inference in such studies. Our design extends more recent work that exploits panel data on ocials' behavior (e.g., Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose ; Bails and Tieslau ; Besley and Case ; ; Besley ; Erler ; Keele, Malhotra and McCubbins ; Snyder and Ting ). ese studies compare changes to behavior over time, reducing confounding due to xed incumbent characteristics. ey also avoid selection concerns associated with retirement decisions by restricting comparisons to incumbents whose election eligibility is mandated by law rather than chosen. We attempt to build on such studies by studying councilors who serve within the same city and deal with similar constituency requests.
Measuring Constituency Responsiveness in U.S. Cities
We collect detailed data on service requests in NYC and SF. ese cities log information on each service request led by residents via --, a system recently implemented in many major U.S. cities to redirect nonemergency requests from --and to centralize hotlines maintained by individual city agencies. e NYC database has around million observations going back to ; the SF database, around million observations going back to . ree aspects of these data allow us to measure local responsiveness to constituency concerns. First, we use the dates a request was opened and closed to measure response times. We discuss what it means for a request to be opened and closed below. Second, we use the reported location of each request to match it with a council district boundary. Both NYC and SF have single-member districts ( in NYC and in SF), meaning that requests and council members are uniquely matched. ird, the data contain information about request type (e.g., public housing request, pothole, abandoned vehicle), which allow us to account for One concern in our study may be that NYC councilors amended the law governing their election eligibility. We discuss the implication of this for our results below, noting that it likely biases against nding an eect of the term limit extension (see p. ??). We also show that our results are not driven by newly eligible councilors who supported the reform (SI ).
e NYC data are available at https://nycopendata.socrata.com/, and the SF data at https://data.sfgov.org/City- 
How City Councilors Impact Service Responsiveness
We interviewed --representatives, heads of city agencies, and councilor sta to better understand how service requests are handled by city bureaucracies and to what extent councilors intervene to impact service responsiveness. Based on these interviews, Table A . provides an outline of how requests are handled from the time they are submitted by a resident until they are closed by agency sta. A request has been opened when all the intake information about the request has been logged and it has been assigned to an agency. An agency will close the request aer resolving it (which may require rerouting it to a dierent agency) or aer determining that no action is necessary. In all cases, agency workers will physically inspect the issue
In the subsequent empirical analysis, we trim the top .% (for NYC ) or % (other analyses) of observations in terms of response times to eliminate large, potentially inuential outliers. ese dierent trimming rules are based on the number of large outliers in each of the samples. ese rules result in response time distributions that are quite similar across the samples used for analysis. In SI , we demonstrate that our results are robust to dierent decisions about whether and how much to trim the data. We also dichotomize response times (e.g., more or less than ve days) and run linear probability models, conrming that our conclusions are not driven by outliers. to determine what type of work is needed. More than anything, Table A. highlights the important role individual agencies play in the --system: --provides a centralized and standardized way for requests to be submitted to various agencies. Once there, agencies are responsible for resolving requests and can prioritize across dierent requests as they see t.
Given the central role agencies play in resolving requests, it is not surprising that council sta say they regularly turn to agencies to address concerns about service responsiveness in their district. is happens both at a small and a large scale. At a smaller scale, all city council oces we talked to help residents with individual service requests. (Well-staed oces have a "constituency services" team devoted just to this.)
Oen, this involves helping the resident le a --request. e councilor oce will then follow up with agency intergovernmental liaisons or other agency sta to make sure city workers respond to the request as quickly as possible. Council sta said they are in contact with agencies on a daily basis. ey also spoke about the eectiveness of these eorts. For example, a council sta member said that contacting agencies about a specic constituency concern "really smooths things along. " Another council member concerned about overdevelopment regularly monitors and responds to constituency concerns led via --or the Department of Buildings, and is known for his success in limiting new housing development in the district. is type of action shows that councilors are highly motivated and able to help residents with service issues.
Our interviews also revealed two ways in which council oces can impact response times at a larger scale. e rst and most common way is to inform agencies about broader issues within the district. Several district oces said the council member or an oce representative meets frequently with agency commissioners or intergovernmental liaisons. For example, a sta member, speaking of sanitation and transportation issues in the district, told us "[our district representative] discusses the specic issues that constituents have so that they [i.e., the agencies] are aware of them and so that they can take appropriate measures. " Oce sta also send letters to agencies. For example, a sta member said her oce oen compiles issues their conere is no information in the database about the actual action taken by the agency -that is, whether an agency closed the issue aer actually resolving it (a-b in Table A .) or aer determining that the request was "non-warranted" (c).
It is unlikely, however, that dierences in non-warranted requests could impact our results. First, the --director of communication and agency representatives indicated that a very small proportion of requests are non-warranted (e.g., prank calls). Second, even if that were not true, dierence-in-dierences, which we use below, account for baseline cross-sectional dierences in non-warranted requests as well as for over-time changes that aect both treatment and control districts. Our inferences would only be threatened in the unlikely scenario that changes to response times to nonwarranted requests were dierent in treatment and control districts and these changes were such that they improved overall response times more in treatment districts.
stituencies have and sends a letter addressed to the agency commissioner (e.g., they recently sent a letter to the Department of Transportation regarding potholes in the district).
e second way in which council districts aect constituency responsiveness at a larger scale is by working with other council members, forming task forces or taking legislative action. For example, a representative from a city council oce said that, when they notice that an issue is prevalent, they have a meeting with other councilors, especially councilors that represent similar districts. en if enough agree, they launch a task force that consists of central city council administrators, agency representatives, and city council members.
e representative gave an example concerning a request regarding special education. Noticing that there were not enough resources for special education within the district, the council oce formed a task force that implemented a program to better integrate special education children into the public school system.
Although we cannot directly quantify the eectiveness of these particular actions in terms of response times, the interviews highlight plausible mechanisms for how elections inuence local responsiveness. When councilors are no longer eligible to seek reelection, or when elections are distant in time, councilors are less motivated -and they allocate less time and sta resources -to pressure agencies to impact response times in their district.
Lastly, this discussion may raise the question of why agency commissioners and sta heed the demands of city politicians in the rst place. First, the monitoring problems found in many principal-agent relationships are limited in our case. is is because the data collected by the --system can be used to monitor response times at the council district level. City councilors told us they use these data, as well as reports released by the city, to track responsiveness in their district. Second, council sta report building professional and personal relationship with agency sta. Whether because of social or quid pro quo benets, such relationships could be used to get agencies to reallocate resources when necessary. ird, if agency commissioners care about their budgets, then they should strive to do well by elected ocials, who approve the city budget, including funding for both the --program and city agencies. Allocations to these agencies are not guaranteed year-to-year. For example, between scal year and , the Department of Public Works (DPW) in SF saw its annual general fund allocation drop from nearly . million to . million (Dept. of Public Works ).
Local Law in NYC requires the --service to make periodic public reports with call data aggregated by city council district. In SF, the --data include information on the supervisor district in which the service request is located.
Eects of Reelection Eligibility on Constituency Responsiveness
To estimate a causal eect of reelection eligibility on politicians' eorts, we take advantage of the term-limit extension instituted by Mayor Bloomberg and the New York City Council on October , . e extension enabled the mayor and city councilors to run for three rather than two four-year terms in oce. But it did not aect every city councilor equally. A subset of councilors ( of ) were in their rst term of oce at the time of the decision, and would have been eligible for another term regardless. Another group of incumbents suddenly went from being term-limited to eligible for reelection.
We implement a dierence-in-dierences (DiD) design. e treatment group consists of incumbents who were termed out before the October , decision but ran for a third term aer the decision. is group has incumbents, as not all of the newly eligible councilors took advantage of the extension.
Our control group is incumbents who were allowed to seek reelection both before and aer the decision. We estimate the DiD using the following model with councilor and period xed eects:
where i indexes complaint; d, city council district; and t, day. e outcome variable is the number of days it took to resolve the complaint. D dt is an indicator equal to for treated city council districts aer the termlimit extension and otherwise. e parameter associated with this variable, , is of key interest. A negative estimate of would indicate that response times dropped -improved -in treatment districts relative to control districts aer the term limit extension. e model includes xed eects for council district (↵ d ) and time period ( t ), which is simply an indicator for the period aer the extension. Because response times vary by the type of request -as Table makes clear -we also include xed eects for complaint type ( type ) and the day on which the complaint was lodged ( t ). In all analyses, we cluster the standard errors on councilor. 
Observations , , , , † Weeks on either side of the extension used to estimate Eq. ‡ Dierence-in-dierences estimator (see Eq. )
Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses
. for the two week window). Compared to events known to severely hamper city services, these response time changes are meaningful. For example, the January -, blizzard, which dropped over a foot of snow in NYC, resulted in a % increase in response times to service requests opened in the time window of the blizzard, and labor day weekends on average result in an % increase in response times.
ese results are robust to an alternative modeling strategy. We transform the dependent variable, coding a new binary outcome equal to if a complaint was resolved within ve days and otherwise. We then substitute this new outcome variable on the le-hand-side of Equation and estimate linear probability models. e bottom-half of Table includes the results from this specication. e probability that a complaint was resolved within ve days increased by two to three percentage points in those districts aected by the term-limit extension, as compared to control areas. is should alleviate the concern that large outliers -requests resolved long aer the policy change -are unduly inuencing the results.
In the nal column of Table , we include the results using a -week window around the policy change.
As expected, the eect attenuates: the coecient declines by a factor of between two and ve. Both treated Our inferences are unchanged if we employ a version of the block bootstrap, in which we randomly draw districts with replacement to form our bootstrap sample. and control councilors are eligible for reelection aer the policy change, and it appears that their response time trends become more similar as the election approaches.
Identication
To interpret the estimates presented above causally, the parallel trends assumption must hold. at is, in the absence of the term limit extension, treatment and control districts must have followed the same trend in responsiveness.
Going into our analyses, we had two potential concerns about this assumption. First, treated and control councilors could have dierent pre-treatment trends due to the upcoming election, which took place in November . For example, reelection eligible incumbents (the control group) could be ramping up their eorts in anticipation of the election, relative to ineligible incumbents. Second, given that city councilors approved the extension, it is possible that they could have anticipated that it would pass. If so, treated incumbents may have ramped up their eorts with constituency services before October , when the extension was formally approved in City Hall.
We test this expectation more fully in SI .
We recognize that to recover the average treatment eect on the treated (ATT), two additional assumptions -the stable unit treatment value (SUTVA) and constant treatment eects -are required. Spillovers could result from city-wide improvements to response times, e.g., due to Mayor Bloomberg's reelection bid, in line with Levitt (). However, this would biasˆ toward . In addition, we note that ATT does not generalize to the control group (by denition). In our case, features of the treatment group -for example, their additional experience in oce -may impact the size of the treatment eect. is does not violate the identifying assumption. ATT is a relevant quantity to the extent that most elected ocials can stay in oce for more than one term before term limits are imposed. Furthermore, note that this assumption does not imply that treatment and control districts must be balanced on levels. For example, the design accounts for the fact that second-term councilors may have better average response times due to their longer tenure in oce. e unit xed eects in Equation , represented by ↵ d , account for all xed dierences (whether observed or unobserved) across councilors and council districts.
Evidence from the time the extension was debated suggests that anticipatory eects were limited. e term limit extension was catalyzed by Mayor Bloomberg positioning himself as the city's most capable leader in the face of the nancial crisis. Given the uncertain economic climate and falling city revenues, Bloomberg was successful in convincing a majority of council members (and, in the election, voters) that his nancial experience would be necessary in the tough times ahead (Honan ) . e bill passed, -, just two weeks aer Bloomberg had decided that he wanted to run again. e nal vote was preceded by hours of public hearings and a full day of oor debate in what was described as a divided City Hall (Chan and Hicks ). We draw dates at random from January , to September , (six weeks prior to the actual term-limit extension). We then re-estimate Equation using these "placebo" dates to dene the treatment event. Displayed on le are the estimates and % condence intervals forˆ from Equation using three weeks of data on either side of each date. e estimate from the actual term-limit extension is the right-most, black point. On the right, we show the distribution of t-statistics from these estimates; our actual result is indicated by the dashed line.
We evaluate the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption in a set of "placebo" tests. We substitute the actual date of passage with a set of earlier, fake dates. We then re-estimate the DiD using these new time windows. If these estimates fail to statistically dierentiate between treatment and control districts, then we have evidence of parallel pre-treatment trends, which in turn would make us more condent that treatment and control districts would have followed parallel trends in the absence of the term-limit extension.
Figure (a) displays the placebo estimates and their % condence intervals. (ey are based on randomly drawn dates from January , to September , , six weeks prior to the actual term-limit extension.) e estimate from the actual term-limit extension is the right-most, black point. As is apparent in Figure ( b), the t-statistic of our actual estimate is more negative than all of the placebo estimates; our actual result is the only coecient signicant at the %-level. Based on these placebo tests, there is no evidence of diverging pre-treatment trends, shoring up the parallel trends assumption.
Eects of Election Timing on Constituency Responsiveness
Do elections also aect when incumbents exert eort? We use data from two elections to answer this question:
the New York City Council Elections of , and the analogous San Francisco Board of Supervisor Elections of .
Empirical Strategy
We compare incumbents who are seeking reelection (treated) with incumbents who cannot seek reelection due to term limits or staggered elections (control). In NYC, which has term-limits but no staggered elections, of incumbents ran for reelection in . In SF, which has term-limits and staggered elections (half of the Board is elected every two years in alternating elections), one incumbent sought reelection in . We pool data across the two elections; SI presents the results for the two elections separately.
We evaluate whether response times fall more precipitously as elections approach in districts where incumbents are eligible to stand for reelection, relative to districts represented by an ineligible councilor. To do this, we estimate the trends in response times for both groups aer accounting for level dierences across districts, the nature of the complaint, and the day of the week on which a complaint was led. Our empirical model is
where i indexes complaints, d city council district, and t represents days before the relevant election date.
D d is an indicator for treated city council districts (i.e., those with an eligible incumbent). We include xed eects for districts, request type, and the day of the week on which the complaint was made, and cluster the standard errors at the council district. To analyze legislative eorts, we use the same specication without the xed eects for complaint type ( type ) or the day of the week ( day ).
We again label the quantity of interest as . e key identifying assumption is that eligible and ineligible incumbents would have followed parallel trends in eort levels absent elections. A negative estimate indicates more sharply declining response times among treated incumbents (i.e., increased eort) relative to control incumbents.
ere may be interesting level dierences in responsiveness across treatment and control groups. However, this comparison is confounded by dierences between councilors -for example, in their experience -so we do not devote attention to the intercepts, ↵ d . 
Results
In Figure , we explore whether the timing of elections aects responsiveness to --requests using a nonparametric approach that allows for non-linear trends. In both NYC and SF, it appears that response times to service requests declined more rapidly in treated districts than in control districts. (Before creating this plot, we rst partial out the variation in response times explained by the complaint type, council district, and day of the week on which the complaint was made.) e SF gure (right) is particularly striking: roughly one year prior to the election, response times fell o sharply in the treated district, while they continued to increase in districts with ineligible incumbents. In NYC (le), response times appear to be declining almost monotonically in treated districts, while in control districts, response times continue to increase through the winter months of . is gure demonstrates that our ndings persist, even if we allow for exibly estimated time-trends.
Interestingly, response times in NYC appear to increase slightly following the primary election. City Council elections in NYC are partisan, and -in all but a few districts -the Democratic nominee has an overwhelming advantage in the general election. e primary election, on the other hand, tends to be competitive. Aer weathering the primaries, 
Days to General Election
Observations ,, ,, ,, , † Maximum number of days before election used to estimate Eq. .
Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses.
In Table , we present the results from estimating Equation using the primary and general election
dates. e results also split by the number of days before the election we use to estimate Equation , corresponding to , ., , and . years. ese results indicate that response times declined more rapidly in districts with an eligible incumbent. e estimates of are negative in all models. While the coecient sizes remain relatively stable, our estimates get more uncertain as we shrink the number of days before the election used to estimate Equation , potentially due to the decreasing number of observations (and statistical power) with the shorter time frames.
To interpret the substantive eect of the estimates, note that they represent the implied eect for one service request as we move one day closer to the election. e estimates from column imply that moving six months closer to the election corresponds to a four-day reduction in response times in treated districts relative to control. ese eects are larger than the change in response times induced by the January blizzard in NYC or by labor day weekends, events that substantially aect service delivery.
incumbents may therefore be unconcerned that shirking will be punished by partisan voters. We estimate Equation for both the primary and general elections.
In San Francisco, supervisor elections are non-partisan, so there is no party primary. However, there is a ling deadline days prior to the election, aer which new candidates cannot enter the race.
Our data from NYC go back only to January , , so the two-year window corresponds to rather than days. We analyze the elections separately in SI , and one aspect of the SF election is worth highlighting.
e estimates are more negative when the control group is term-limited incumbents rather than incumbents facing no election in (due to staggered elections). Our simple decision-theoretic model predicts that incumbents facing reelection -even if that contest will not occur for two more years -should be more concerned about public service responsiveness than term-limited incumbents. Voters may be particularly attuned to the responsiveness of their elected ocials during election times, whether or not their supervisor is seeking reelection. us, from the perspective of an incumbent seeking reelection in two years, improved performance during this time period may be an opportunity to persuade future supporters at a moment when supervisors' eorts are particularly salient.
If these dierences are driven by reelection incentives, then they should disappear aer the election.
As Figure illustrates , the trends in our treated and control districts appear very similar in the year aer the election. In SI we perform a series of placebo tests using data from the post-election period, and these
An alternative interpretation of our results is that bureaucrats in city agencies are less responsive to lame-duck councilors. However, this interpretation cannot explain why our reelection seeking incumbent outperforms her o-cycle colleagues, who are not lame ducks.
results also suggest that trends in responsiveness do not diverge aer the elections. When election contests are not imminent, response times follow similar trends in our treated and control districts.
As an additional falsication test, we look at the November NYC city council election -a contest in which all incumbents were eligible to run by virtue of the term-limit extension. With no variation in eligibility, we expect to nd similar trends in responsiveness among rst and second-term incumbents.
Reassuringly, our estimates of in this context are precisely estimated zeros (see Table SI .) . is provides additional evidence that variation in election eligibility explains our ndings.
Reallocation from Legislative Activity?
To assess whether improved response times to constituency services come at the expense of legislative action, we also collected data on city councilors' legislative activity. e data for NYC come from the city's Legislative Research Center, which compiles all of the legislation introduced in each city council meeting, including information on which councilors sponsored or co-sponsored the actions. We collect similar data for SF. In
November , the SF Board of Supervisors started to publish information about which supervisors sponsored particular ordinances, resolutions, and requests for hearings at each Supervisor meeting.
ese data sources allow us to generate panel data on legislative activity for every city councilor and supervisor in NYC and SF. For both cities, we code our outcome variable as the number of local laws and resolutions sponsored or co-sponsored by a council member at each meeting. As councilors are better able to control when a bill is introduced than when it is eventually passed, we use the date of the council meeting in which the legislation was introduced and not the date of its eventual passage or dismissal.
We nd no consistent evidence that the term-limit extension or approaching elections change legislative eort. Using Equation () for column and Equation () for columns -(omitting xed eects for complaint type and the day of the week), the estimates are small in magnitude and typically indistinguishable from zero. e one signicant coecient in column implies that eligible incumbents (co)sponsored three fewer actions in the six months prior to the primary date. During that period, the average eligible incumbent sponsored over sixty actions (sd = ); this eect represents a less than ve percent change in their overall 
Observations , , † Days before election used to estimate model.
Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses
activity. ese ndings suggest that incumbents were not cutting back on legislative eort as they ramped up their work on constituency services.
Discussion and Conclusion
is paper considers an long-standing question in political science about how elections shape the work that representatives do while in oce. Analyzing million service requests from NYC and SF, we nd that city councilors' electoral incentives are a robust predictor of responsiveness to constituents' concerns. Elections encourage overall improvements to constituency responsiveness, consistent with many models of representative democracy. Elections also induce cycles in responsiveness: incumbents ramp up their eorts as elections approach, suggesting increased eort to signal their competence to voters just before they head to the polls.
ese ndings also contribute to an empirical literature on the local politics in the U.S. Despite ProgressiveEra municipal reforms that reined party machines' control over municipal services (Anzia ; Bernard and Rice ; Bridges ; Trounstine ), scholars have identied many ways in which politics still shape local service provision. For example, polarized political preferences (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly ; Trounstine ), the racial identities of politicians and constituents (Hajnal and Trounstine ; Schumaker and Getter ), and variation in local institutions (Hajnal ; Hajnal and Trounstine ) all inuence how
We have also tried specications in which we split the outcome variable by type of legislative action, with substantively similar conclusions. We use only two time frames ( and . years) when estimating these models due to the availability of these data.
local governments distribute services. We extend this scholarship by showing how local elections shape the allocation of municipal services within cities over the course of campaigns.
While we are cognizant of the important dierences between city and congressional oces, our ndings also bolster past studies that suggest congressional incumbents seeking reelection devote more eort to constituency services (e.g., Carey, Niemi and Powell ; Carey et al. ) . ough evidence of ideological shirking among retiring or ineligible incumbents is mixed (see Table A .), there seems to be greater agreement among the small set of studies that focus on casework or constituency services as an outcome.
Lastly, what are the normative implications of our ndings? In Madison's ([] ) propitious view of representative democracy, elections discipline politicians should they fail to serve voters' interests.
However, our results could also be indicative of pandering (Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts ) or responsiveness to a subset of constituents (Sances ), rather than diligent eort to serve all residents. Two pieces of evidence leave us more hopeful. First, we do not nd that incumbents reallocate eort away from legislative activity towards constituency service requests. Election incentives appear to increase overall eort; eligible incumbents are not obviously pandering by focusing only on voters' short-term interest in, for example, getting a street-light or sidewalk repaired (Mani and Mukand ) . Second, we do not nd that our eects are driven by increased responsiveness in neighborhoods with a particular racial composition (see SI ); in fact, we nd no consistent evidence that our eects are moderated by race. Despite many disaected voters, an electoral connection persists.
is does not mean that race is inconsequential for service provision in NYC and SF, as we only look at heterogeneous eects and not level-dierences in responsiveness.
Appendix Summary of Existing Literature on Last-Term Shirking
We conducted a survey of work on last-term shirking in the United States by collecting articles from and onward from Google Scholar. We started with results returned from key word searches (e.g., "shirking term limits" and "shirking retirement congress"), choosing articles that clearly studied the eect of term limits or retirement on an outcome that captures incumbent eort (or, conversely, shirking) in some way. We followed the current literature in dening incumbent eort broadly, e.g., including scal outcomes that may not be directly attributable to politicians. We identied additional studies by following up on citations in the articles that were initially returned in our search. is procedure resulted in a total of articles on the topic. Notes: X = results in study can be interpreted as evidence of shirking, 5 = no evidence of shirking, † = conclusion applies only to a subset of states or legislators. e four types of shirking are with respect to vote content (ideology), legislative attendance rates, constituency services (casework), and agency oversight. Cells are le blank if a study did not consider a given type of shirking. "Fiscal variables" include per capita state government expenditure and taxation (and sometimes borrowing costs and economic growth). Table A . provides an overview of how --service requests are handled from when they are opened until they are closed. A request has been opened when all the intake information about the request has been logged and it has been assigned to an agency. e agency will close the request when the issue has been resolved (which may require rerouting it to a dierent agency) or when it has determined that no action is necessary.
Appendix Information about Service Protocol and Time Line
In all cases, agency workers will physically check on the issue to determine what type of work is needed. In the paper, we code our dependent variable as the number of days it took from the time a request was opened until it was closed. A request is called in to a --response center or submitted online.
. A--representative (or online system, if the request was submitted online) will ask for and determine the type of request, and an actioning agency will be assigned. Based on a preassigned workow, the service representative will then do the intake of required information (as requested by the assigned agency) and submit the request. e request has been opened, and the date is recorded in the --database.
. e request appears in the acting agency's queue for action, and will have a service level agreement (SLA) specifying a due date based on the request type. e agency may prioritize among dierent requests as they see t.
. Agency sta physically inspect the reported issue, with one of three potential outcomes, each of which results in the request being closed: a. Agency sta resolve the issue (may require revisits). Some issues are easily veried as resolved (e.g., grati removed), while others may require following up with the constituent (e.g., calling the next day to verify that heating works). Once the agency has ensured that the issue is resolved, the agency will report it as closed. b. e issue is rerouted to a dierent agency. is may happen if the agency determines the issue falls outside its jurisdiction. For example, NYC Department of Transportation may reroute a highway issue to NY State, or a misreported issue may be rerouted to a dierent city agency. In this case the issue will be marked as closed once it has been resolved by the new agency. c. Agency sta determine that no work is warranted (e.g., trash was already picked up, prank call) and mark it as closed. To be published online.
Appendix Summary Statistics

Table SI. Eect of Term Extension of Request Volume
Dependent variable:
Observations , , , ‡ Dierence-in-dierences estimator (see Eq. )
Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses.
SI Robustness to Including Incumbents Not Seeking ird Term (NYC )
e treatment group for our main analysis consists of incumbents who were termed out before the October , decision but ran for a third term aer the decision. Not all of the newly eligible councilors took advantage of the extension; eight incumbents le politics or ran for dierent positions (e.g., four ran for comptroller). In Table SI ., we show that our results hold but decline in magnitude when we include all termlimited incumbents in our treatment group. e results attenuate as expected: we would not expect councilors intending to leave oce to exert more eort following the term limit extension. 
Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses SI Heterogeneous Eects by Vote on the Extension (NYC ) 
Dependent variable:
Response Time Constesting Incumbents All Incumbents
Observations , ,
SI Post-Extension Trends as NYC Election Approaches
In Table SI ., we explore post-extension trends in response times leading up to the November , election in NYC. Since all councilors were eligible to run for reelection aer the term limit extension, we do not expect dierent response time trends in districts represented by previously term-limited councilors (treated) and districts represented by councilors who were always eligible for reelection (control).
We test this expectation using Equation . We use two time periods: a year and six months before the election. If there were no dierential changes to response times in treated and control districts, thenˆ from Equation should be indistinguishable from . Table SI . provides strong evidence for this: the estimates of dierential time trends are very close to zero.
We emphasize that this analysis is dierent from our tests of the impact of the term-limit extension, for which we use Equation . e extension analysis shows that response times dropped in districts represented by previously term-limited councilors in the weeks aer the extension. However, as we also show, this eect attenuates with time. is makes sense given the analysis presented here: as the election approaches, response time trends in treated and control districts become indistinguishable. 
Uses days before election date to estimate Eq. . Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses.
SI Placebo Tests for Election Timing Results
We randomly draw dates from the period following the election in NYC and the election in SF.
We then re-estimate from Equation . We use days to estimate these placebo regressions. us, our "placebo" election dates have to be drawn from an interval of days that is at least two years aer the actual election date. is explains why the placebo dates fall well to the right of the estimate associated with the actual election dates (the le-most, black points). ese tests suggest that the dierential time trends that we discover in our analysis do not persist aer the election. Displayed above are the estimates and % condence intervals forˆ from Equation using two years of data before each placebo date. e estimate from the actual term-limit extension is the le-most, black point. 
SI Separate Results for NYC and SF
Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses SI DiD Estimates by Racial Composition
Our ndings suggest that public service responsiveness improves when public ocials are eligible to seek reelection and as elections approach. We are also interested in whether some neighborhoods benet more from these improvements than others. In particular, we are interested in whether the racial composition of neighborhoods is responsible for heterogeneous treatment eects in responsiveness. Public ocials may, for example, favor coethnic constituents or constituents from a particular racial group.
To carry out this analysis we begin by matching the --database with census data on the racial composition of every block in NYC. We then code two characteristics that indicate each block's relationship with the city council member representing the electoral district in which the block is located: whether or not its largest group is coethnic with the city council member; and whether or not its majority group (if any) is coethnic with the city council member. We also create variables for each block's plurality group and (if applicable) majority group without regard for its relationship with the city council member. We then re-run our analyses on dierent subsets of the data based on these variables.
e results are displayed in Figures SI. and SI.. ey suggest that the heightened responsiveness that followed the term-limit extension in is not driven by ethnic favoritism: neighborhoods in which the plurality (or majority) group is coethnic with the city council member representing the district do not see larger drops in response times than other neighborhoods. We nd some evidence, however, that neighborhoods populated primarily by Hispanics or Asians see larger drops in response times, though this may not reect the ethnicity of these neighborhoods but rather some unobserved characteristic of the neighborhoods that we are not controlling for here (e.g., location).
Moving to the council elections, response times dropped quite uniformly across neighborhoods two years to a year and a half before the elections. In general, there are few interesting heterogeneous treatment eects to report, perhaps with the exception that Asian neighborhoods saw larger drops closer to the election.
Our failure to uncover consistent heterogeneous eects related to neighborhoods' ethnic composition should not be taken to imply that there are no ethnic disparities in public service delivery. Our empirical strategy leverages changes in responsiveness and, thus, does not address level dierences in service delivery across neighborhoods of varying composition. We run Equation in subsets of neighborhoods dened by the attributes on the y-axis. "Window" gives the number of weeks on either side of the extension we use. e estimates of (with % CIs) from these regressions are displayed above. We run Equation in subsets of neighborhoods dened by the attributes on the y-axis, for dierent time windows before the election. e estimates of (with % CIs) from these regressions are displayed above.
